J.D. VANCE NEEDS A HISTORY LESSON OR TWO: Iran's Duplicitous Games With Inspectors are Well Documented - We've Been Here Before

JUNE 22, 2026

Stop Iran Now

Pictured: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2018 revealing that the Mossad had uncovered a secret "atomic archive" in Tehran which revealed four locations where environmental swipe tests detected particles of man-made, chemically altered uranium. These locations had not been declared by the Iranian regime as required by its non-proliferation obligations and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

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THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM HISTORY ARE CERTAIN TO REPEAT IT

J.D. Vance proclaimed today "Tehran is agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors back into Iran - and this is a big deal - a "major milestone for the American people."

That my friends is a bunch of cow manure.

Vance needs to do his homework -- and fast.

If he did he would understand that the Iranian government has spent over two decades engaging in a documented pattern of concealment, stalling, and intimidation to restrict oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), regardless of whether of not they are "inside Iran.".

Indeed this is part of the regime' s long game. It uses diplomatic duplicity as a weapon of war.

The truth is no many how many international showcases the Vice President stages -- how many blood-soaked hands he shakes - and how many "agreements" are signed.........

He cannot transact morality and

He cannot transact good faith.

For those of us who have carefully followed the Iran file for many years - this is a frightening and disheartening de ja vu.

If Vance had done his homework he would have known that Independent reports from the IAEA Board of Governors, the United Nations, and international watchdogs show that Tehran has frequently manipulated documentation, physically altered nuclear sites before inspections, subjected inspectors to targeted harassment and consistently demanded to remove inspectors who displeased them.

They have also continuously refused to address the many of the issues raised by the IAEA ultimately leading the agency to conclude that "it is "not in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful." 

History show that entering into any so-called verification protocol with the Iranian regime is akin to a child's game of hide and seek.

The primary historical instances and tactical patterns of deception, stalling, and harassment are organized below by category: 

1. Covert Facilities & Active Deception 

Iran’s relationship with the IAEA began with systemic concealment, followed by elaborate cover-ups when secret operations were exposed. 

The Secret Natanz and Arak Facilities (2002–2003): Iran hid its massive uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy-water facility at Arak from the IAEA. The secret sites were only revealed to the international community by an Iranian dissident group in 2002, forcing Iran to admit to their existence in 2003 after delaying an official IAEA visit for months. 


The Gchine Uranium Mine Fraud: Documents recovered from Iran's secret "Nuclear Archive" revealed that the Gchine uranium mine was originally operated under a covert military weapons project known as the Amad Plan. Iran falsified corporate and ownership documents to deceive the IAEA into believing the mine had always been under the control of the civilian Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

The Gchine Uranium Mine Fraud: Documents recovered from Iran's secret "Nuclear Archive" revealed that the Gchine uranium mine was originally operated under a covert military weapons project known as the Amad Plan. Iran falsified corporate and ownership documents to deceive the IAEA into believing the mine had always been under the control of the civilian Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). 


Fabricated Records: In 2022, intelligence reports and IAEA assessments revealed that Iran had systematically used stolen internal IAEA documents to anticipate what investigators were looking for, subsequently fabricating alibis and tampering with logs to evade accountability. 


2. Physical Tampering & Stalling Tactics (Sanitization) 

When the IAEA requests access to an undeclared site, Iran has routinely stalled for months or years to scrub, raze, and erase evidence of nuclear activity before letting inspectors inside. 

The Parchin Military Complex (2012): The IAEA sought access to Parchin to inspect an explosives containment vessel used for hydrodynamic nuclear triggers. Iran blocked inspectors for months. During the delay, commercial satellite imagery caught Iranian forces tearing down surrounding buildings, scraping away layers of topsoil, paving over the earth, and washing down the facility to remove any trace of radioactive material. 


Undeclared Uranium Particle Sites (2019–2025): The IAEA discovered man-made uranium particles at three undeclared locations: Varamin, Marivan, and Turquzabad. Iran stalled discussions for nearly half a decade, either denying access entirely or offering non-credible technical explanations regarding how the nuclear materials arrived there. 


The Tesa Karaj Centrifuge Plant (2021): Following an explosion at the site, Iran banned the IAEA from entering to repair or replace broken and missing data-monitoring cameras. This effectively created a multi-month blind spot, preventing the agency from tracking centrifuge manufacturing. 


3. Harassment & Intimidation of Inspectors 

Iranian authorities have frequently used aggressive personal targeting and arbitrary detentions to pressure and intimidate individual IAEA inspectors. 

Physical Confrontations at Checkpoints (2021): The United States and European allies formally rebuked Iran at the IAEA Board of Governors after Iranian security officials subjected female IAEA inspectors to "inappropriate and invasive" physical harassment at nuclear facilities. 


Arbitrary Detention at Natanz (2019): An IAEA inspector was briefly arrested at the Natanz enrichment plant. Her travel documents were confiscated, and she was prevented from leaving the country after Iranian officials falsely claimed she tested positive for carrying explosive nitrates. The IAEA vehemently disputed the claim and condemned the harassment. 


The Weaponization of "De-Designation": Iran has repeatedly exploited its legal right to approve inspectors by systematically banning the IAEA's most experienced personnel.

2010: Iran blacklisted inspectors who reported that secret uranium metal equipment had been mysteriously removed from a research lab between inspection windows.

2023: Iran expelled a large group of core, top-tier international nuclear experts in an unprecedented political retaliation against a Western censure. 


The Washington Institute
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Summary Table: Timeline of Key Safeguards Disruption

Era / Date	Action Taken by Iran	Strategic Impact
1985–2002	Covertly ran uranium enrichment programs without declaring them to the IAEA.	Led to the IAEA's landmark 2005 formal declaration of non-compliance.
2012	Blocked access to the Parchin military base while using heavy machinery to raze roads and buildings.	Obliterated the environmental evidence needed to confirm hydrodynamic nuclear weapons testing.
2019–2020	Shut off IAEA access to monitoring cameras and blocked access to two historical storage sites.	Caused a severe "continuity of knowledge" gap regarding Iran's true enrichment capacity.
2021	Turned back inspectors at the Karaj centrifuge facility twice and harassed female inspectors at checkpoints.	Intimidated oversight staff and masked advanced centrifuge manufacturing.
June 2025	Denied access to multiple undeclared uranium tracking sites.	Led to a renewed IAEA Board vote finding Iran in total non-compliance.
June 2026	Publicly denied claims that it authorized the return of blocked IAEA inspectors following diplomatic talks in Switzerland.	Left the international community entirely blind to current weapons-grade enrichment stockpiles.

4. Persistent Stonewalling on Critical Issues

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has maintained two distinct "unopened" or outstanding portfolios of unresolved nuclear issues that Iran either refused to fully address or stonewalled for years.

These dossiers center on evidence of clandestine nuclear material and potential weaponization work.

A. The "Possible Military Dimensions" (PMD) File (Pre-2015)

Before the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed, the IAEA detailed a list of 12 specific outstanding areas regarding the "Possible Military Dimensions" of Iran's historical nuclear program. Iran routinely dismissed these as "fabricated" allegations. The core unresolved issues included:

Explosively-Driven Neutron Sources: Clandestine research into uranium metal discs used to initiate a nuclear chain reaction.

High Explosives Implosion Testing: Large-scale hydrodynamic experiments conducted at the Parchin military complex to simulate nuclear weapon detonations.

The Green Salt Project: Clandestine efforts combining uranium conversion, high-explosives testing, and missile re-entry vehicle design.

Detonator Development: The engineering of fast-acting exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators suitable for a nuclear weapon device.

Integration into a Missile: Engineering blueprints aiming to fit a nuclear payload inside the re-entry vehicle of Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile.

Note: While a political compromise formally "closed" the PMD file in December 2015 to let the nuclear deal move forward, the IAEA noted that Iran never fully disclosed the historical extent of its weapons research.

B. The Undeclared Materials and Sites Investigation (2018–Present)

In 2018, a second major portfolio emerged after independent intelligence (the Mossad) uncovered an "atomic archive" in Tehran.

If Israeli Intelligence had not been able to accomplish this phenomenal intelligence feat -- there would have been several important locations that would have been completely ignored by United Nations inspectors due to the regime's violations of its disclosure obligations.

The IAEA opened a new probe into four undeclared locations where environmental swipe tests detected particles of man-made, chemically altered uranium.

For years, Iran has either blocked physical access, "sanitized" the sites to erase evidence, or failed to provide technically credible answers:

Turquzabad: An open-air site in Tehran where the IAEA found processed uranium particles. The agency concluded Iran used the site to secretly store heavily contaminated equipment and nuclear materials between 2009 and 2018 before sanitizing it.

Varamin: A location suspected of housing a clandestine pilot-scale facility for uranium ore conversion in the early 2000s. Iran failed to give a credible explanation for the uranium traces discovered here.

Lavisan-Shian: A historical site where a uranium metal disc was utilized for small-scale neutron initiator tests.

Marivan: A site near Abadeh linked to high-explosive implosion testing and the preparation of neutron detectors. (The IAEA paused questions on this specific location in 2023 after receiving an explanation, though it remains tied to the wider historical weapons work).

The gridlock over these outstanding issues culminated in the IAEA Board of Governors passing a resolution formally declaring Iran in breach of its Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement.

The IAEA warns it has lost "continuity of knowledge" over Iran's highly enriched uranium inventories and centrifuge manufacturing, while Iran continues to deny inspectors access to facilities that were bombed.

The challenge is compounded by the facts that the JCPOA allowed for the development of advanced centrifuges which are more efficient and easier to hide - as well as the regime's numerous "partners in crime", two of which, quite ironically, happen to be playing key roles in these negotiations.

All sanctions preventing sales of any nuclear related materials or weapons -- including dual-use materials -- must be strictly enforced as an essential deterrent.

Commentators and political hacks are trying to assure the American peiple that we will "trust but verify". The ugly truth is that in the case of this regime you cannot trust and you cannot verify.

That is why the only certain way to prevent Iran from continuing on its path of mass destruction - and from eventually developing nuclear weapons - is to eliminate it and to and support the Iranian people in their valiant struggle for freedom and self determination.