IRAN FAILED TO DECLARE ACTIVITIES AND MATERIAL IN VIOLATION OF SAFEGUARD AGREEMENT -
“These activities and the nuclear material used therein [...] were not declared by Iran to the Agency as required under the Safeguards Agreement.” -International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael M. Grossi
VIDEO: Iran's former President Hassan Rouhani explains how the Iranian government deceived the international community rapidly accelerating its illicit nuclear program in the period from 2003-2004.
WE'RE SHOCKED, SHOCKED THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN - A SERIAL DECEIVER AND TRANSGRESSOR - IS YET AGAIN PLAYING A GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE WITH INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS .....WHAT WOULD BE MOST INFURIATING IS IF THIS INTRANSIGENCE IS YET AGAIN IGNORED AND WHITEWASHED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY - TO THE GREAT PERIL OF THE PEOPLE THEY PURPORT TO REPRESENT.
March 8, 2022
STOPIRANNOW.ORG Via INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY -
By David Albright and Sarah Burkhard March 8, 2022
The IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - March 2022 “These activities and the nuclear material used therein [...] were not declared by Iran to the Agency as required under the Safeguards Agreement.” -International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael M. Grossi
This analysis summarizes and assesses information in the latest IAEA’s periodic safeguards report, NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the most recent of which was issued on March 5, 2022.
The analysis also provides background information on the former Iranian nuclear weapon sites under IAEA investigation.
In an important conclusion, the IAEA reports that Iran violated its safeguards agreement by possessing and processing uranium metal at Lavizan-Shian, a site known as Location 2 in previous IAEA NPT compliance reports (see below).
The IAEA report also states that inspectors have no additional questions and this issue “could be considered as no longer outstanding at this stage.“ However, this statement should not be misinterpreted as permanently letting Iran off the hook over Lavizan and undeclared uranium metal; the fundamental finding is that there was a safeguards violation at Lavizan-Shian. The lack of additional IAEA follow-up likely reflects the difficulty of dealing with Iranian non-cooperation and dissembling actions about its past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons program. More than likely, this issue or an equivalent one will come up again.
This report also includes a joint statement between the IAEA and Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) aimed at resolving outstanding issues related to three additional Iranian sites where the IAEA found man-made uranium particles and over which the agency has faced Iranian stonewalling since the investigation began in 2019.
In a marked difference from the workplan leading up to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this statement does not commit the IAEA to “close” its investigation or satisfy itself with a series of joint meetings and false Iranian statements or declarations.
Given that the IAEA has already said that Iran violated its safeguards commitments at Lavizan- Shian, it is likely that Iran is continuing with its fiction that it never had a nuclear weapons program—hardly an optimistic start to a difficult joint process.
Missing from this report is a timetable for the IAEA to reach a broader conclusion or verify that Iran’s nuclear declaration is complete. As such, the joint statement represents a step, even a minimal step, toward a determination over whether Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. In any nuclear deal, sanctions should not be reduced unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA and fully addresses its concerns. In other words, if Iran continues its deception during the implementation period of a new nuclear deal, a practice it followed during the implementation period of the JCPOA, sanctions should not be reduced.
IAEA/Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Joint Statement
On March 5, following a visit by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi to Tehran, the IAEA and the AEOI released a Joint Statement to “accelerate and strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution of [outstanding] issues.”1 The agreement aims to resolve by the June 2022 Board of Governors meeting the IAEA’s remaining questions about three undeclared Iranian sites where it found man-made uranium in 2019 and 2020. Tehran has stonewalled the IAEA’s probe and has not faced censure from the IAEA Board of Governors for doing so since June 2020.
The board is meeting this week from March 7 to 11. At the same time, Iran, the United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and China, or P5+1, are reportedly near the conclusion of a new nuclear deal, a modification of the JCPOA, which entails lifting many sanctions on Iran. With details on the new deal publicly unavailable, it is not known whether the implementation of the new deal depends on the resolution of the safeguards issues, but it should.
The timeline set by Grossi suggests that needed information will be available in time for the United States and its partners to review the IAEA’s conclusion before the end of an implementation period. A deadline for Iran to respond with "written explanations including supporting documents to the questions raised by the IAEA" is set for March 20, 2022. This deadline should provide a first important indication on whether Iran is cooperating or not.
According to the Joint Statement, the IAEA will review the material and, within two weeks, “submit to the AEOI any questions on received information.” Within one week after the IAEA has submitted its questions, the IAEA and AEOI will meet in Tehran to address the questions and will hold separate meetings on each site. The director general will report his conclusion by the June 2022 Board of Governors meeting.
While Grossi has not directly stated that there can only be a nuclear deal if the safeguards issues are resolved, during a recent press conference he stated, “if clarification of very important safeguards issues were to fail,” it would be “difficult to imagine that you can have a
cooperative relationship as if nothing had happened.”2
Further, Grossi should be credited for his constant pushback on a possible political resolution of the safeguards issues. He stated, for example, “The safeguards issues will not be resolved politically because I will not go for that.”3
Lastly, as written, the joint statement denies Iran the opportunity to simply “check the boxes” of a scheme without honest cooperation. As Grossi put it, “There is no artificial deadline, there is no predefined outcome, there is no predefined name for what I am going to do.”4
Four Locations of Concern5
Location 1: Turquz-Abad Warehouse
The agency reports no new information or interactions with Iran regarding Location 1, and therefore the safeguards issues relating to the location remain unresolved.
Location 1 is an open-air warehouse in Tehran’s Turquz-Abad district which held cargo containers and other items that purportedly contained nuclear-related equipment and material.6 In 2018, the IAEA observed activities consistent with sanitization of the site. Commercial satellite imagery confirms this activity and documents Iran’s earlier, speedy removal of all shipping containers and scraping of the grounds.7